WARSAW REFLECTION GROUP
Warsaw, 31 January-1 February 2005
of European Security Institutions
Introductory remarks by
Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld
Minister of Foreign Affairs
I would like to welcome all participants of the Warsaw Reflection Group in the capital of Poland in its winter dress. It is remarkable, how distinguished group of scholars and diplomats I see around this table. Thank you for coming. This meeting of the Warsaw Reflection Group is the second one. Many of us decided so less than a year ago. I am happy to say that we have around this table the group of the best and brightest both from Europe, the United States and Russia. The subject of our discussion – the complementarity of European security institutions - both with the history and present relevance of this topic has been properly chosen.
The subject is complex and opinions on larger topic of effective multilateralism divergent. Nevertheless I very much hope that we will manage to avoid the experience of one of the Western diplomats of the 70s. Following his talks with the Soviet diplomat, he wrote in his memoirs “I was not listening to him, as he did not listen to me. Therefore we understood each other perfectly, and managed to create a genuine vacuum between us”. With those words as a caution and a wake-up call I look forward to our discussion.
As I already said this is the second meeting of the Warsaw Reflection Group. The first one on the future of transatlantic link and our common transatlantic security was held early April 2004. The meeting produced a report broadly distributed before NATO Summit in Istanbul.
Its conclusions emphasized the importance and necessity of more coordinated approach to security by the EU and NATO. It would be worthwhile – in the broader context of major European security institutions - to start today from where we stopped year ago. The ambition of this gathering could be to offer a valuable food-for-thought (a report) to the ongoing political and intellectual debate in Europe. The biggest political event in Europe of 2005, namely the Council of Europe Summit, planned in May in Warsaw will offer the political forum to address problems of effective and complementary institutional action devoted to the cause of peace and security. As such it will also be the right occasion to share our thoughts with its participants.
Therefore, in addition to the discussion paper you have in front of you, I would like to highlight a few points.
Building Europe without divisions is a responsibility, which we all share with international organizations involved in defending security, democracy and human rights. In today’s world, marked by plethora of conflicts calling for effective international action, the use in complementary way of available stabilization tools is the question of the day. The international organizations created by the states and operated by them can only be as effective tools in their hands as members themselves allow them to be. The overall objective of such a focus centered at co-operation of international structures is not limited only to the issue of “more security at lower cost”. It has to be placed at “more capable” multilateralism as a source of credibility for European organizations and states operating behind them.
NATO, EU, OSCE and Council of Europe for decades have been actively promoting mutual understanding and cooperation between states in Europe and beyond. The problems they face now are not only of structural or organizational nature, but mostly stem from divergent political and national agendas of their member-states. Despite righteous criticism directed towards the state of co-operation among them, some basic questions have to be asked in this context:
· What purpose do the traditional international security organizations serve in the post-Cold War era? Have they already fulfilled their mandates? Do we need new institutional setting in Europe?
· How to change them to tackle effectively the current security agenda (so different in nature as fighting international terrorism and containing the raising weave of nationalisms)?
· To what extent the old-type agenda (like arms control, confidence building, assistance in safe passage from dictatorial regimes to democracy, legitimization of international status of new European democracies) still reflect security concerns of European states?
· Are the existing European institutions able to offer the effective partnership to the US? Will they be able to resist US accusation against them being ineffective and imposterous in proposing replacement of interest-driven cooperation to supranational imposition of norms of behavior not guaranteeing full respect to national interests?
· Are they willing and able to deliver necessary assistance to countries offering best prospects for democratic evolution (Ukraine)?
III. Three main actors
All those questions seem to be more relevant in the light of the modifications the broad perception of European security has undergone in the post Cold War era. Its focus has largely shifted from politico-military dimension to more complex, “soft” areas of sustainable development, good-governance, human rights, etc. On the other hand its practical application is of truly global nature, not confined to any geographical or geo-political barriers.
Thus security can only be managed by a combination of political, economic, and military means, and hence all international actors must cooperate in order to maximize their effectiveness. In other words, well-functioning international institutions, bound by universally applied international law are still located at the core of the “security process”.
Despite new characteristic of modern security, at last part of the current discussion on effective multilateralism follows the old paradigm. It ascribes central role to the plethora of autonomous international organizations, having their own topical fixes, and co-operating on an ad hoc basis. Contrary to that, the new security mechanism, currently developing in Europe, follows largely different logic. It refuses to accept all those structures as fully independent actors. They might be productive should circumstances allow, but the institutional security co-operation in Europe is now more-than-ever built around three main actors:
· first, the “Europe proper” – embodied by the EU, putting effective multilateralism at the fore-front of its global agenda. The European Union is the only continental international organization defining its agenda in holistic strategic terms as “full spectrum of instruments at its disposal, including political, military, and civilian, trade and development activities”;
· second, the badly needed “transatlantic link” – with NATO as the comprehensive platform of pursuing transatlantic security agenda, and the only real security partner for the European Union, offering her broad complementarity of military potentials. It is however to be expected that NATO’s role as a forum monopolysing US-EU partnership might be challenged in the future;
· third, Russia trying to tie closer the group of dependent CIS countries. Among all contentious issues, driven by value-oriented approach of the West, and interest-driven approach by Moscow, the commonality of modern security demands should bring rather constructive engagement of both Russia and the transatlantic community.
The future institutional co-operation in Europe will depend on mutual interplay of these three players and convergence of their principles and influence. By themselves they propose their own version of multilateralism and understanding of ties binding them with the world of UN norms and principles. The security system (architecture) has to be transformed to encompass these factors to live up to new threats and challenges. In turn the three players have to renew their commitment to the international community, including through readiness to act in concert when rules of civilized international behavior are violated. To that end more attention should be given to generation of political will and platforms for concerted actions rather than to formal structures and fixed procedures.
In a world of global threats and so far no universal strategy to counter them, Europe needs effective multilateral system, based on capable international institutions, and universally recognized legal norms and human rights standards. As problems blocking emergence of such a system are political in nature, any solutions will be neither easy nor quick.
Though a lot within inter-organizational interplay can be improved through institutional fixes, self-imposed modifications, and efforts led by bureaucracies, any significant and lasting solution may come only as a result of high-level political engagement on the part of key international players. Its natural consequence, including through the strategic debate, would bring acceleration of shaping a new institutional order in Europe. At present juncture one has to be cautious, as there exist no guarantee of improving deficiencies of the old one or even closing of the suddenly opened “pandora box”. The genuine challenge in this respect is based on the question to what extent this process should be enforced upon Euro-Atlantic community or let alone its own evolution.
In the meantime the natural temptation may appear to go the short-cut using existing institutions as merely instruments serving the objectives of loose ad hoc coalitions. The apparent advantages of such coalitions are obvious:
- composition across and beyond the organizational setting in Europe,
- lack of “free-riders” slowing-down the process,
- no limiting rules of procedure, focus on the task,
- clear leadership, visible contributions.
Though circumstances might cause giving active consideration to such solutions, they should be viewed as largely imperfect tools of generating political will and unity of purpose. Legitimizing such a course of action would also mean unconditional surrender of the search for effective institutional platforms offering “first choice” to all nations concerned.
I wish to close my remarks by saying a few words in favor of more cohesion between the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
Among European organizations, the OSCE and CoE are the two most obvious candidates for closest possible co-operation as they remain active in the same field of democracy-building and human rights. The decisions on enhanced co-operation have already been adopted by both organizations, but the substance is still in the process of shaping. The May 2005 CoE Third Summit to take place in Warsaw seems to provide an excellent opportunity to mobilize the true synergy of these two organisations. It might also pave way for future substantial and practical discussion on further complementarity between other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations. I invite you to reflect on this subject in the course of our discussion. A few suggestions to start-off you will find in the Annex I to the discussion paper.
Thank you for your attention.