

THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

On the Republic of Poland's Foreign Policy for 2008

Mr. Speaker,
Members of the Parliament!
Honored guests, your Excellencies and members of the Diplomatic Corps!

For the last 18 years, the Republic's ministers of foreign affairs have stood before this High Chamber in order to present their policy plan for the next year. This honorable duty has now fallen to me. As this is the first *exposé* of a minister of foreign affairs of the Civic Platform and Polish People's Party government, I wish to sketch a more panoramic picture of Polish foreign policy for the coming years. It is for this reason that I beg your forgiveness for this debate taking place somewhat later than tradition would demand. The reasons for this, after all, were beyond my control.

Foreign policy—the daily cooperation and confrontations between states and nations, as well as the intertwining of their goals and interests—is like a mirror in which we can examine ourselves. In it become evident grandeur or pettiness, prestige or obscurity, development or downfall. The change in these reflections over time shows us where we have come from, who we are and what we should do in order to strengthen the Republic.

I say this, conscious of the fact that this year we shall celebrate the 90th anniversary of our regained independence; an anniversary of the days when Józef Piłsudski sent out telegrams letting the world know of the rebirth of the Polish state. Telegrams, thanks to which, after nearly a century and a half statesmen returned to Poland from abroad.

Neither by diplomacy, nor by arms, were we able to defend our independence. Despite great achievements, the 21st anniversary of the Republic's rebirth was never celebrated, for Poland no longer existed on the political map of Europe.

Esteemed Members of Parliament:

Just as with that anniversary, next year's celebration of the two decades that have passed since we threw off the communist yoke prompts historical reflection. Especially contemplation of **what constituted the strength, and weakness, of the Polish state.**

Let us remember that twenty years ago, in 1988, Poland, even though international law recognized state, was neither a sovereign, democratic, nor a modern. Our Polish-ness and European-ness was limited to mockery, conspiratorial cultivation of the traditions of liberty, to enduring faith and loyalty to the Church, and to protests in times of desperation and hope.

This manner of affirming our Polish-ness and European-ness informs our self-image to this day. After nearly three centuries of countless tragedies, it is hard to believe that we have finally reached a friendly port.

Honoring all of this—all that is heroic and great in the struggles of freedom-fighters of past, and present, generations, let us not yield to the temptation of holding on to past wrongs and persisting in suspicion.

We live in a free, sovereign and democratic Poland. We are members of the European Union and NATO, which ties Europe to the United States. All of us, therefore, have reason to feel satisfied and secure.

Patriotism should not devolve into a cult of victories and tragedies; we have plenty of other claims to praise.

Acknowledging the “underground state” of multiple Polish insurrections and uprisings, let us respect the “grounded state”—with the necessary modern infrastructure, productive economy, efficient administration and strong military. Pragmatic calculation is more friendly to the democratic spirit than revolutionary fervor. Conscious of the problems we have yet to solve, let us be guided by a vision of modernity that depends more on self-esteem and openness than on suspicion and closing ourselves off from the world.

Dear colleagues,

The breakthroughs of 1989 shaped our history in ways reminiscent of the civilizational leap taken by Poland under the Piast dynasty, a thousand years ago. It was then that Poland accepted ancient traditions and a Christian identity. Relations with the Czechs and Hungarians, as well as treaties with the German rulers of the Holy Roman Empire, lead Poland onto the political stage of the Roman world.

Conciliation with the Germans, cooperation with the Visegrad countries, and especially Polish membership in the institutions of the Western world are evidence that the Piast spirit once again animates our identity—both Polish and European.

That which the Piast’s lacked several centuries ago—integration with the main current of European civilization—we have accomplished today in the blink of an eye. No one gave this to us. We alone—though with the help of our friends—achieved this. Having done so, Poland, just as 600 years ago, has become the standard and model of transformation for our Eastern neighbors, in particular for the kindred nation of Ukraine. Then, in the Jagellonian era, the Republic spread examples of noble liberty and tolerance, become the cohesive force that over subsequent centuries kept together the multiethnic mosaic of elites in our region. It is for this reason that we believe that the mandate of the Lublin Union will be fulfilled only when our Eastern European brothers find themselves within the European Union. This is not an old-new messianism, but a practical observation that strengthening liberty and democracy in our region also serves the interests of our Republic.

Poland will be a normal European state when it will have normal European neighbors, on either side of its borders.

The style of diplomacy depends, in large measure, on initial assumptions. Ideologues eagerly avail themselves of concepts—often arbitrarily defined—such as “national interest” or “raison d’État.” How many times, in recent memory, have we heard of “national interests” in regard to our Western and Eastern neighbors? Anyone who defined them differently was either ignorant or a traitor.

It might be worthwhile, therefore, to consider a convincing **definition of the “national interest”** for contemporary Poland. We can all agree, I am sure, that the most important thing of all is that our nation retains a sense of control over its own fate. It does not suffice to be free—we must be competitive. And so, we must grow stronger. Growing stronger means rising to the level of development of our partners in the European Union. Poland’s membership in the European Union inspires to achieve a civilizational leap. **Such civilizational development is in our national interest.**

Thus, our Polish national interest is not contrary to European integration. Quite the opposite. Peaceful European integration is in our immediate national interest. We are not afraid of this process; we do not threaten our fellow citizens with the rise of a European super-state, invoking an imaginary servitude to those bigger and stronger than us. This is neither the history nor the intent of European integration. We are not the only ones to reject servitude; no European nation would accept it.

The European Union is not a threatening “Other;” we are Europe and the Union.

The consequences of this misunderstanding were manifestations of “hard diplomacy,” which shocked our EU partners, just as Don Quixote’s crusade against windmills shocked the people of the Renaissance.

In today’s Europe, extravagant rhetoric is simply counterproductive. Our place in the European family, and in the world, will not be shaped by passive-aggressive words. That place will be defined by the health of our democracy, the level of our economic development and innovation, the competency and efficiency of our national and local administrations, a dependable judicial system, independent media, an active civil society, and the ability to cooperate with partners both at home and abroad. In one word: an awareness of shared goals, professionalism, and effectiveness.

We need to comprehend Western integration so that it can serve the ends which Poland desire. Which ones? Strengthening our position in the Union. This is conditioned on our influence on the actions of our European partners. It requires understanding and identifying with the EU community. In the European Union, **there is nothing to be won by going it alone, but much to be lost.** Naturally, we expect others to share this attitude. This organic interdependency between the national and the European good was understood already by the conservative and Christian-democratic founding fathers of Western integration. This view was shared by European social-democrats. They all worked towards European unification for over 50 years.

In Poland, on the other hand, we are only now beginning to grasp these truths. Soviet-style integration, which meant hegemony and intervention in the spirit of the Stalin-Brezhnev doctrine, did not give rise to such unificatory attitudes. Quite to the contrary, it forced satellite states to close themselves off, as much as they could, in order to protect the fundamental national substance, which was increasingly one-dimensional because it was devoid of creative inspiration from without and wasting away from anachronism and autarchy.

That is why the affirmation of European values—which serve as the foundation of solidarity, as the source of compromise and cooperation—is so important to us. More than 80% of our fellow countrymen support Polish membership in the European Union because they know that it is we who benefit from this solidarity.

I believe that understanding the developmental needs of today's European Union is a challenge not only for the inhabitants of the continent on this side of Laba and Litawa. Just as nothing relieves us of the obligation to understand the Union, so too we expect from our more tenured partners not only knowledge of, but openness to the specific stage of development in which our society and economy find themselves. Europe will not unite in spirit until our Western neighbors go to the trouble of understanding, really understanding, that **our fight for freedom in the latter half of the 20th century is as much as European experience as their prosperity in that same period.**

We expect this especially because recent years have shown that the enlargement of the Union has neither lowered its decisiveness nor affected its competitiveness. Quite to the contrary, the new members of the EU are now among the avant-garde of dynamic development and societies full of hope in the future of the Union.

Members of Parliament!

Our primary national interest is the need for a civilizational leap, which requires a friendly and secure international environment. In the longer term, it is the rise of our nation to the first ranks of European states. This strategic goal will be served by the realization of five priorities.

First: **Poland strong through the solidarity of the European Union.**

The European Union is a unique phenomenon in international cooperation. The Union is neither a “super-state” nor a regular international organization. Fundamental to the Union is the equality of various spheres of functioning, making of the Union a space of self-willed limitations and creative compromises, reached in the name of achieving new developmental goals. It is important that the nature of the Union has reoriented us, just as it has other member states, away from national egoism and towards the common good and altruism, towards shared conditions and challenges, shared chances and threats, shared interests and benefits.

Primary importance, therefore, must be given to strengthening and making more effective the legal and institutional foundations of the European Union. Let us hope, that once the Sejm and Senate decide that Poland should join the group of nations that have ratified the Lisbon Accord, President Lech Kaczynski's signature will make that decision a reality.

The Union stands before an important budget debate, resulting from an analysis of the Union's budget for the years 2007 – 2013 as well as from the need to work out a new, long-term financial perspective for the next 7 years. The truth is that drafting a budget comes down to the art of equally dividing disenchantments and disappointments. This cannot, however, be a moment in which new challenges and obligations multiply. After ratifying the Lisbon Accord the reform of EU agricultural and social policy will also become a challenge. We will not agree to their transfer to the budgets of member states. We do, however, support the realization of the Lisbon Strategy. We decidedly support maintaining the Union budget at a level exceeding 1% of the GDP of the entire European Union. We do this conscious that there will come a time when a modern and affluent Poland will become a provider of funds for the EU budget and will be able to help others. We shall endeavor that changes to the mechanism for financing education and technology in Poland will lead to great harmonization with the research and innovation policies of the European Union. Introducing the common currency—the Euro—in Poland remains a long-term goal. We will set a date for entering the Euro zone, taking into consideration the developments of our economy as well as society's readiness for such change.

The Lisbon Accord created opportunities for strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Poland has good reasons for being a key actor on this stage. Greater integration should proceed hand-in-hand with an ever-greater role for the Union in its own neighborhood and on a global scale. We are concerned that the European Neighborhood Policy is properly shaped, especially as it applies to the East. This is a result not only of Poland's geographical location on the Eastern boundaries of the EU, but also from our consciousness that East of our borders lie **European neighbors**, while to the South—in North Africa and the Middle East—lie **neighbors of Europe**. This is a fundamental distinction.

Nonetheless we value the efforts of those members of the European Union who, through the Southern European Neighborhood Policy, wish to bring about peaceful development, stability and prosperity in all Middle Eastern states. The world will be safer when peace reigns in the Middle East and proper conditions arise for the development of millions of young people in their own countries.

Poland should continue to specialize in shaping common foreign policy towards the East. Especially due to our geographical situation, historical experiences, cultural ties to the East, and our competency, we not only feel predestined to such an Eastern specialization, but are encouraged to take it up by our partners in the Union.

We aim to do so with our closest partners, with whom we shared a common fate in the past: with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary; with Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia; and also with Romania and Bulgaria. Additionally, a special partnership presents

itself in the form of our relations with Sweden. The neighborhood policy towards the East should serve to raise the social and political standards of our neighbors to Union levels. As a result, this neighborhood policy will fulfill their individual agreements for partnership and cooperation with the Union, which will create a European perspective for the most advanced countries.

Precisely such a moment has arisen in the case of the agreement between the Union and Ukraine. Ukraine is an ever more trustworthy candidate for membership in Western institutions. We encourage our partners and allies to creatively combine incentives for reform with evidence of transformations already taking place. We assure our Ukrainian friends that it is their readiness to act that will decide about Ukraine's membership in the institutions of the Western world.

The accession of Ukraine will confirm the strength of the European model of civilization.

At the same time, the deadline draws nearer for commencing negotiations between the European Union and Russia about a new Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. Polish stipulations regarding the elimination of embargoes on export of animal and plant products as well as the consent of the European Commission to take up negotiations with Russia regarding questions of energy solidarity, have been met.

Let us consider, however, the lessons learned from the current crisis in the negotiations. For the European Union they are indisputable—only by speaking in one, deliberate and purposive voice, when it comes to controversial matters, has any effect. The signal sent at the EU – Russian summit in Samara was understood. It showed that the consolidation of the Union is important not only for the Union itself, but that it results in a more constructive policy on the part of Russia.

The message being sent to Russia amounts to showing it that the European Union, and the Western world in general, wants wide-ranging cooperation. It wants cooperation, but without one-sided reservations. We, as Poles, just as other members of the European Union, believe that the trust of all parties to such cooperation would flourish if it were based on common values. However Russia persists with its own system of values, rooted in its own traditions and cultural codes, in the meanwhile EU – Russian cooperation based on mutually agreed to “rules of the game” must suffice. Evidence of this attitude is Prime Minister Donald Tusk's statement—made in the realist spirit—that rather than ineffective implacability, **“we will cooperate with Russia, such as she is.”** Polish – Russian mechanisms for cooperation and dialogue, such as the Committee for Strategic Cooperation, the Forum for Civic Dialogue, and the Group for Difficult Issues, are ready, at least on the Polish side, to fulfill their mission. Let us give them a chance to do so.

I wish to turn to our Belorussian neighbors and assure them that Belarus can count on Polish support as long as it respects human rights, the political rights of the opposition, dialogue, compromise, and openness towards Europe. We will be ready, just like the rest of the European Union, to aid in Belarus' development. This is a stipulation and interest

of Belorussian supporters of independence and democracy, as well as of the Belorussian minority in this country.

A priority will be the efficient enactment of Schengen regulations. Protection of Union borders cannot lead to the creation of new barriers. We want such regulation of individual travel as to not create unnecessary limitations for arrivals to Poland. We would say to those that consider us to be Rusophobes that we would like citizens of the Russian Federation, just as those of Ukraine or Belarus, Moldova or Georgia, to have the easiest possible access to the European Union, that they might freely sojourn in the EU as tourists, students, and entrepreneurs.

At the same time, we are concerned by the rising tensions in Georgia and the attempts to violate its territorial integrity. We direct towards our Georgian friends expressions of solidarity and assurances that their security, as well as Euro-Atlantic integration are close to Poland's heart.

Members of Parliament!

A common European foreign policy, in order to be effective on any dimension of importance to the Union—be it in regards to China and the whole of Asia, to the Mediterranean world and the Middle East, or to Latin America and Africa—requires intra-Union consolidation. Large member states, among them Poland, have an important role to play in this process.

A coalition of member states, especially along regional or sub-regional lines, can also influence such consolidation. We turn our attention here to the need to strengthen cooperation with our partners from the Visegrad Group. We have in mind the possibility and necessity of fortifying relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, especially in regards to energy security. We are faced with the great task of increasing cooperation among the Baltic States. The Baltic has become an intra-Union and Russian sea. Our friends in Sweden take such cooperation quite seriously.

Crucial to creating a common foreign policy for the European Union will be the attitude of our Weimar partners—Germany and France.

Some have not yet understood that **Germany, today, is our ally**. It is true that Germany is a country that, after reunification, is undergoing a process of redefining its own historical, political and cultural identity. This process, however, is taking place within a wholly democratic and European framework. Let us remember that in 1990—the year of German reunification—Chancellor Helmut Kohl said: “Germany is our fatherland, but Europe is our future.” We would add: **for us this is a common future and common European interest**. In terms of the depth and constancy of the democratic and European choices, today's Germany—in contrast with its past actions—has made an unprecedented choice. Our Western neighbor is trusted by European and American allies. Poland also hopes for dialogue and the possibility of close cooperation with Germany, which would

allow us to overcome our historical differences. **We cannot, and should not, forget.** The great achievement of Polish bishops in 1965 remains intact.

Nonetheless, in addition to political-historical integration, Poland expects from Germany strategic dialogue, modeled on German – French relations. We count on the realization of extant treaties and agreements. We are geared towards cooperation on issues important for both our countries and for the whole of the Union. The Eastern dimension of common European policy, which for many historical and contemporary reasons draws the attention of both Poland and Germany, presents the best opportunity for such cooperation.

France also remains an important partner for us. Polish – French friendship remains as fundamental and self-evident to many Poles as the great victories of Napoleon. Today we are pleased by the appreciation of France’s Atlantic azimuth, as well as by Paris’ greater involvement in the East.

The abovementioned signals coming from Germany and France bode well for dynamic cooperation in the Weimar Triangle. We see greater possibilities for cooperation—not only to the East—with our Visegrad, Baltic, and Nordic neighbors as well as with Great Britain, the Netherlands and Union’s Mediterranean countries. We support peaceful transformation in and integration of the Balkans.

We are trying, together with our partners, to discern the direction that the rise of new powers on the world stage might take, especially that of China. We support the cooperation of the Union and NATO with non-European democracies, especially Japan and India. We are aware of global threats and will not waver in taking the appropriate actions to thwart them. Our geopolitical compass is not only the East – West axis. We feel ourselves evermore—precisely in the spirit of solidarity—responsible for a globalized world, including the North – South axis.

It is impossible, however, to take on such responsibilities without guaranteeing the appropriate position for our representatives in the institutional hierarchy. “Nothing is lasting without institutions,” the co-creator of the European Monetary Union, Jean Monnet, used to say, “but nothing is possible without people.” Still relatively few Polish experts and politicians hold responsible positions within the Union. Given the formation of a European Foreign Service and the planned Polish leadership of the Union in the second half of 2011, we will strive to open the door for Poles to assume leadership posts within the Union.

Honorable Members!

Our second priority is the strengthening of Poland’s role in the global security system. It is an accepted truth now that never before in modern history has the threat of global conflict been so small, and yet that of local conflict so high. What’s more, never before has there been such danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction in such a conflict. The question remains therefore: how should NATO, the strongest military alliance in the

world, which for decades successfully countered the Soviet military monster, react to such untraditional threats now that the Soviet Union is no more?

The uniqueness and asymmetry of current threats, to which the unlikely response of a military counterattack or the impossible formula of revenge, give rise to frustration and doubt about whether in such conditions the response of our allies is trustworthy. In some countries questions are asked about the need for alliances or military forces. These are superficial dilemmas, only for those who, due to a fortunate geographical position, believe they inhabit a postmodern paradise, where armed conflict is simply *passé*. We, as a country on the borders of the Alliance, must remember about the saying that **every country has an army—its own or foreign**. Many times we have been persuaded that having one's own is by far the better solution...

The North Atlantic Alliance retains two essential characteristics. Politically, it remains a crucial institutional link between two branches of Western civilization: North American and European. Militarily, it still guarantees the allied countries adequate protection from a multitude of threats.

Honorable Members!

Poland aims to remain an initiating actor in NATO. We believe that the time has come for NATO to create a new strategy. Its integral element should be a vision for enlarging the Alliance, the harbinger of which would be a declaration—satisfactory to us—that Ukraine and Georgia are potential candidates for membership. We support this modernization of NATO and its adaptation to contemporary threats and are will be engaged in the Alliance's military activities, including expeditionary and stabilization operations, such as those in Afghanistan.

Our engagement in Alliance actions brings with it costs and risks, but also benefits. Engagement is a confirmation of Poland's trustworthiness as an ally. Additionally, veterans of stabilization operations, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, now constitute the core of the Polish armed forces.

In return, we expect from our allies and from NATO, maintaining a balance between actions undertaken beyond the territory of the Treaty and the ability of the Alliance to defend its own borders. We expect, also, that Poland will become home to certain elements of the Alliance's infrastructure and military installations. We would like for Polish officers, to a greater extent than has been the case, to be chosen to highest posts in the Alliance's leadership and included in strategic planning and operations, especially in the case of operations in which Polish soldiers take part.

Honorable Members!

When it comes to security we must also turn our attention to the strategic partnership that binds us with the United States. This partnership exceeds political dialogue and military

cooperation. Waiving the visa requirement for Polish citizens traveling to the US would be both a symbolic and practical fulfillment of this partnership.

The most important issue, however, is something else. I am convinced that Americans are aware of Poland's trustworthiness as an ally, of which we have given proof more than once and continue to do so. They know, also, that Poles have noticed the United States' readiness to undertake risk and sacrifice in the name of liberty and democracy across the world. This mutual respect and sympathy should become concrete. For this reason, accepting with good will American arguments regarding the anti-missile shield, we expect that in keeping with President George Bush's statement after meeting with Prime Minister Tusk on March 10th, the US will **play a more active role in the modernization of the Polish armed forces**. This, and not the question of visas, is the most important question in our relations. It will also be a testament to our continued partnership and an indication of the intentions of our friend.

Members of Parliament!

We are convinced that the European Union should also take an active part in guaranteeing security as well as returning—by military means as well—peace and stability regionally and beyond Europe. Such engagement by the Union should complement, rather than duplicating, NATO efforts. We do not want to choose, **we want to have two complementary insurance policies**. In the context of the European Security and Defense Policy we will concentrate on such issues as crisis reaction, humanitarian assistance, training and the European Defense Agency. We will support the development of the European Defense Force. We will take active part in the discussion about revising the European Security Strategy.

Poland will continue to stand against the weakening of arms control measures and disarmament agreements, as well as carrying out responsibilities related to arms export control and relevant sanctions. We are guided by the hope that the Treaty for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe will be ratified.

We will seek ways to overcome the OSCE crisis. The demands of the European Council towards its members, in regards to respecting human rights and democracy, should be strengthened. This organization should not serve to make shocking compromises and should not close its eyes on the brutal practices of member states.

Esteemed Colleagues,

Especially important for us is energy security. When energy becomes an instrument, or even weapon, of international politics, it stops being an economic issue and becomes a matter of national security. This is not a dilemma that can simply be solved by pressing several free-market buttons labeled "liberalization," "competition," etc. We consider the mandate for a unified energy security policy contained in the Lisbon Treaty, as a test of Union values. We consider the following to be especially important:

- **firstly:** concrete Union regulations, resulting from the spirit of energy solidarity and translated into the language of practical standards, that no energy projects will be financed by the Union if they will be found by any member states to conflict with their needs for energy security. We support greater competition in the energy market, especially the Third Energy Packet, which foresees the differentiation of production and transportation licenses.
- **secondly:** unified and decisive counteraction of the Union and other states, against any pressure or blackmail from non-Union energy providers. Contracts with providers should contain solutions for eliminating such practices.
- **thirdly:** the diversification of sources and routes for the delivery of energy resources to EU countries as well as the creation of a network of connections and warehouses allowing for the transportation of raw materials between member countries, that—for outside reasons—are experiencing a shortage of energy resources.

Poland will take part in fighting other non-military threats to security such as: international organized crime, trafficking in arms and narcotics, as well as in people, an especially painful phenomenon occurring in Poland as well. We will take part in international endeavors aimed at limiting the impact of climate change. The entire world will turn to Poznan in December, where the 14th United Nations Conference on Climate Change will take place. Being concerned with global security, we cannot overlook the United Nations. For this reason we will support UN reform, aimed at preparing it for new challenges and needs. We support the creation—in the context of reforming the UN—a joint, EU representative to the Security Council.

Protecting human rights as well as the rule of law and democracy have become a Polish passion. The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE is in Warsaw. There, as well, will be created the secretariat of the Community of Democracies, which could play an important role in promoting democratic values throughout the world.

We would like to make sure that such promotion of democracy is more closely tied to development aid, addressed to countries close to us. This conviction results from the belief that our particular experience in the creation of democratic institutions and economic transformation can be translated into effective support of similar processes in other countries. A new Polish strategy of promoting development for the years 2008 – 2015 assumes the inclusion of Poland in Global Partnership for the support of global solidarity.

Mr. Speaker,
Honorable Members!

The third priority of our policy is to strengthen the image of Poland in the world. Since the majority of foreigners leave Poland with a better image than they arrived with, our

“brand” must be worse than our reality. Our image is, unfortunately, still weighed down by negative stereotypes. We will decidedly oppose any attempts to slander our country, misrepresent or falsely distort Polish history.

Such defensive actions, however, are not enough. I will take care that the Foreign Ministry support policies aimed at fostering common knowledge about Poland and her history, especially the most recent. In the coming year Poland will undertake actions to memorialize and highlight the role of our country in the transformations of 1989. It was in Poland on the 1st of September 1939, that the world order that threw a shadow over the whole globe for 5 decades began. And it ended in Poland as well, in 1989. We are pleased by the creation in Gdansk of the European Solidarity Center, an act symbolizing our effective fight for independence, democracy, and human rights.

We should talk about history. But foremost – I appeal - we should always highlight the contemporary aspects of what it means to be a Pole. Let us show that we are rightly proud of our modern Polish state and nation, for never to date—allow me to paraphrase Winston Churchill here—have so many Poles attained so much in so short a time. We are becoming a modern, open society, at home among the institutions and states of the West, and engaging other peoples with trust. This is the best promotion of modern Poland. As the success of the just inaugurated Polish Year in Israel demonstrates, promoting a Poland open for debate about its own history, proud of its many achievements, and curious about the outside world, is met with a positive response.

Honorable Members,

Promoting the image of a successful Poland, we will strive to promote Poland as a country where one can invest safely, produce and sell freely.

Our culture can not only attract, it can also fascinate. In the coming year we will begin Polish Season in Great Britain. In 2010 we plan on organizing a global celebration of the 200th anniversary of the birth of Fryderyk Chopin, who might not need promotion but—standing for prodigious re-interpretation of local Polish values and traditions into universal ones—gives us yet another chance to promote Poland in the furthest reaches of the globe.

In 2011, our presidency of the European Union will provide a unique occasion to promote Poland in the world. For 6 months Poland will be the face of Europe.

The hallmark of modern Poland in Europe will be the European Championship in football, *Euro 2012*, which we are co-hosting with Ukraine. May the spirit of the great Kazimierz Gorski watch over us...

Members of Parliament!

A crucial element in Poland’s image abroad are our fellow countrymen scattered across the world: representatives of old Polish expatriate community, settled for good in new

homelands, Poles from the most recent migrations, and members of the Polish minority in the countries to our East.

This is the **fourth priority** established by the government of Donald Tusk. Our concern is that **Poland be strong through the achievements of our countrymen, and that they be proud of Poland.**

A responsibility of the Polish Foreign Service is safeguarding high quality consular service and care to all Poles abroad. With this in mind we will increase the number of consular offices in countries where there are the most Poles and where there is the greatest need for such service. It is important to us, as Prime Minister Tusk highlighted in his *exposé*, that our countrymen—with new experiences, qualifications, capital, and openness to the world—return to Poland. But we will also support those who want to realize their aspirations and lives abroad. They should know that they can always count on us—especially in times of need. They should be convinced that their nearest consular office is nothing more than a modern municipal office, where they can take care of all their Polish issues, that this office will be neither a fortress nor a humiliating bureaucracy.

Currently, due to the never before seen professional mobility of Poles, we will undertake, together with the Ministry of National Education, a reform of the Polish educational system abroad. It should serve to guarantee the continuation of Polish education to children gaining experience in foreign educational systems, as well as reintegration upon their return. We will initiate changes in electoral regulations to make it easier for Poles living abroad to take a greater part in the country's political life by voting via post or internet. We want to guarantee that Poles, especially in Belarus and Lithuania, are accorded full minority rights. This goes as well for Poles in Germany. A new, important task of the consular service is the realization of regulations for a "Polish Charter."

Honorable Members!

The fifth priority that I submit to you is that **we cannot conduct foreign policy commensurate with our ambitions without a modern diplomatic corps.**

This reform should not be understood as replacing one set of persons with another, with the pseudo-program "regaining the Foreign Ministry," with ideas of building Polish diplomacy from scratch, with a revolutionary "zero hour." A real program of change is not served by trivial myths, and certainly not by treating people with disdain. The truth about Polish diplomacy is complicated, just like any program for reforming it.

Such a program must contain organizational and financial elements. Diplomacy should not be a job, like all others, but service for one's country. First and foremost, it should be a competent diplomacy. With deep understanding of the mechanisms of the European Union, which we will be leading in three years. But not only that. We also require a much broader knowledge than we currently possess of the languages and cultures of Russia and China as well as the Arab world. There has been no work done in this area in the last

several years. Absolutely critical is the ability to react to crises, cooperate effectively with foreign media and non-governmental organizations.

Such diplomacy requires many investments: first of all in people, but also in infrastructure and equipment, especially in the most advanced communications equipment. I would at this point like to thank the High Chamber for understanding the most basic needs of the Ministry shown in work on this year's budget. Thanks to your decisions we are enacting a new educational policy at the Ministry. Polish missions abroad, for the first time in several years, are organizing celebrations of our national holidays while employment offers at Ministry no longer evoke lukewarm responses, as was the case even last year. The Foreign Ministry is also beginning a new model of cooperation with Polish experts and educational and research institutions.

I will present shortly a project to amend the regulation for Foreign Service. Thanks to the merging of the Foreign Ministry with the Office of the Committee for European Integration after January 1, 2009, a new, modern Foreign Ministry will be born. It will embody a sorely needed synthesis of classical diplomacy (concentrated on issues of security and bilateral relations) and the unique potential resulting from the knowledge about European cooperation, created in recent years by the Office of the Committee for European Integration.

The time of Poland's integration with the European Union has passed, today the whole of Poland is in the European Union, the entire administration and every citizen. That much greater must our competence in EU matters and our abilities to coordinate our interests and initiatives be. I trust that the perspective of the Polish EU Presidency will enable us to carry out investments, which will in turn provide us with new instruments and a new image. The incumbent government began its work with an immediate decision to purchase a new headquarters for our representation in Brussels, so that Poland, during its EU Presidency, will have a headquarters corresponding to its significance and position in Europe. I am convinced that, unlike its predecessors, this government will not need another 10 years to build a new chancery in Berlin. It is my dream that in several years the Polish budget will also allow us to build new headquarters for Polish missions in Washington, Moscow and Kiev. We do not need castles with huge entertaining spaces. We need functional and secure offices, whose architecture and interior decor will serve as testaments to Polish art of design and skill.

I am aware of our responsibility to tax payers and the money they have entrusted us with and therefore I will not miss an occasion to save and rationalize our expenses. A more modern and a more mobile diplomacy will allow for a redefinition of the map of our diplomatic presence in the world. I have already started and will continue to revise both the localizations of our outposts and the number of diplomats working there. I will not allow the model of extensive Foreign Service to continue. We should maintain our missions only in regions where we currently have real interests. We will also get rid of wrongly chosen or useless real properties. Poland needs diplomats more focused on fulfilling pragmatically formulated tasks, operating from a smaller number of missions,

but missions stronger as far as infrastructure, competence and communication are concerned. We need fewer, but better rewarded diplomats.

Mr. Speaker!
Honorable Members!

For a considerable number of Solidarity members, the achievements of the last 20 years would have been considered a bold dream in the past. But if all this and more turned out to be actually possible, what could the next 20 years bring? There seems to be a unique opportunity for Poland to close the civilizational gap with Western Europe in the upcoming decade. Today, the standard of living in Poland does not reach even half of that of the most prosperous EU states, such as Germany, France, or Italy. However, if the current pace of our economic growth is sustained, and on the assumption that the highly developed EU members stay at the present rate of development, Poland has got a real chance to come closer to those countries in the next 20 years. I will repeat what I said not that long ago – it is worth planning for Poland and Europe as early as today – a Poland and Europe of our dreams.

We all wish for Polish foreign policy to contribute to the ever-greater prestige of our Republic. Let's direct it even better to realize this task then. And let's avoid making Polish foreign policy a subject of internal party or ideological arguments, more than is necessary in a democracy. Let's also feel responsible for the language of our debate, as daring statements, even though addressed to the Polish audience, very often quickly acquire an international dimension.

Members of the Parliament!

Let me recall my 5 priorities:

- **Poland strong in Europe, a patron and a promoter of Europe's eastern policy**
- **Poland as a strong link in the North Atlantic Alliance**
- **Poland as an attractive brand: a country of success embracing freedom and able to share it**
- **Poland as a country supporting its diaspora, empowered by their vitality**
- **Polish diplomacy as an effective service**

I am well aware that many in the audience might feel disappointed that certain issues have not been raised, or that this or that country has not been mentioned. I'd like to explain, that the choice of a problem based structure of this statement, has unavoidably resulted in certain important matters being left out for further debate. Detailed positions can be found in the "2008 Polish Foreign Policy White Paper", a Council of Ministers document with an important contribution from the President of the Republic of Poland.

There are also issues that we all know about, but which do not have to be revealed to the world.

Thank you for your attention. I am counting on your understanding and I am asking the High Sejm for its acceptance of this statement and approval of the hereby put forward plan of action.